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A. Introduction
The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic led to the closure of courthouses
across Pennsylvania in 2020 and 2021. Although courts and attorneys
adapted to the use of video hearings and arguments, the overall volume of
oil and gas decisions was down from prior years. Nonetheless, there were a
number of noteworthy decisions. The Supreme Court held that oil and gas
lessees could not be prosecuted under Pennsylvania’s consumer protection
law because they were not “sellers” under the statute1 and rejected the
application of the equitable doctrine of abandonment to an oil and gas lease
unless there was a finding that the text of the lease did not provide an
adequate remedy. 2 On remand from the Supreme Court in a long-running
dispute over an alleged trespass from unconventional oil and gas
operations, the Superior Court held that landowners failed to sufficiently
allege that an operator had trespassed onto their adjacent property via
hydrofracturing fluids and proppants.3 A federal district court held that an
oil and gas lease granted the right to transport gas via pipeline from
adjacent lands.4 Another district court ruled in a rare case involving a joint
operating agreement that a non-operator’s claims were time-barred and
additionally barred by an exculpatory provision in the agreement.5 A
district court held that an oil and gas lease with an “at the wellhead” gas
royalty clause permitted the lessee to deduct post-production costs.6 In a
final district court decision, the district court, on remand from the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, denied the Delaware River Basin Commission’s
motion for summary judgment against oil and gas owners who sought a

1. Commonwealth v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 936 (Pa. 2021).
2. SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 249 A.3d 888 (Pa. Apr. 29, 2021).
3. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 245 A.3d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. December 8, 2020).
4. Walls v. Repsol Oil & Gas USA, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-00782, 2020 WL 5502151
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2020).
5. Bradford Energy Capital, LLC v. SWEPI LP, No. 17-1231, slip op., 2020 WL
5747841 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2020).
6. Coastal Forest Resources Company v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:20-cv-1119,
2021 WL 1894596, (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2021).
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declaration that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over oil and gas
operations.7
B. Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1. Com. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934 (Pa. Mar. 24, 2021).
●

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth
could not bring claims under the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law against oil and gas lessees based on
allegedly unfair and deceptive conduct as a purchaser of mineral
estates.

A 6-1 majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court halted a lawsuit
against multiple oil and gas lessees by the Pennsylvania Office of the
Attorney General (OAG) under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), 73 P.S. §§ 201-1—201-9.3.8 The
OAG filed an action under the UTPCPL for alleged deceptive and
anticompetitive practices in obtaining oil and gas leases from landowners. 9
The UTPCPL is a consumer protection law against fraud and deceptive
business practices. Lessees filed preliminary objections that they were not
“sellers” under the terms of the UTPCPL because they acquired mineral
rights from landowners.10 The preliminary objections were overruled by
the trial court, a decision subsequently affirmed in part by the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court.11
The Supreme Court considered whether oil and gas leasing is “trade or
commerce” that could trigger actionable claims under the UTPCPL.12 The
UTPCPL defines “trade and commerce as the advertising, offering for sale,
sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible, real, personal
or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever
situate, and includes any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting
the people of this Commonwealth.” 13 The definition expressly applies to the
sale of things of value, but not expressly to the purchasing of a thing or to
the leasing of a thing. The lessees argued that the UTPCPL is designed to
7. Wayne Land & Mineral Grp., LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n., No. 3:16CV-897, 2021 WL 54209 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2021) .
8. Commonwealth v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 936 (Pa. 2021).
9. Id. at 938.
10. Id. at 938-39.
11. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Com., 206 A.3d 51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019).
12. Com., 247 A.3d at 946.
13. Id. (citing 73 P.S. § 201-2(3)) (internal quotations omitted).
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protect consumers against deceptive behavior of sellers, rather than all
parties to a given transaction. The Commonwealth Court disagreed with the
lessees and concluded that the UTPCPL protected lessors in this context. 14
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Supreme Court held that the
UTPCPL regulates the conduct of sellers and does not provide a remedy for
sellers against buyers.15 The Court cited the definition of “trade” and
“commerce” under the statute, concluding that the UTPCPL prohibits unfair
and deceptive practices in the conduct of “advertising, offering for sale, sale
or distribution” of goods.16 The legislature chose to define trade and
commerce as only acts of selling for purposes of the UTPCPL. This choice
aligns with the intended purpose of the UTPCPL in protecting consumers.
In leasing transactions, the lessee was in the position of a buyer not a seller,
purchasing rights to the landowners’ mineral estates in return for bonuses,
royalties and other payments.17 Therefore, the lessees were not subject to
regulation or claims under the UTPCPL.
The Supreme Court also considered whether the OAG’s “antitrust”
claims were actionable under the UTPCPL. The OAG’s additional anti-trust
conduct claims were moot as a result of the decision that the alleged
deceptive conduct as lessees did not fall under the UTPCPL.18
2. SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 249 A.3d 888 (Pa.
Apr. 29, 2021)
●

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed finding of equitable
abandonment of an oil and gas lease when lower courts did not
consider whether lease provisions directly addressing
termination provided an adequate remedy at law.

The leases at issue covered two parcels in Warren County, Pennsylvania.
The first contained 350.51 acres and the second contained 1,112.1 acres.
The leases were effective in 1985 and contained a five-year primary term
that would be extended “for as long hereafter as oil or gas or other
substances covered hereby are or can be produced in paying quantities, as
determined exclusively by the Lessee, from the leased premises . . . or this
lease is otherwise maintained pursuant to the provisions hereof.” 19 The
14. Id. at 940-41.
15. Id. at 946.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 947 (citing Com., by Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812,
826 (Pa. 1974)).
18. Id. at 950.
19. SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 249 A.3d 888 (Pa. Apr. 29, 2021).
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leases contained a number of provisions that could extend the term of the
lease, including a delay rental provision, a continuous operations clause and
a shut-in royalty provision. 20 The leases also contained the following
regarding notices of default:
Default and Election of Remedies - In the event of a default,
Lessor agrees to notify Lessee in writing as to the nature of the
default and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days ... to cure such
default. Lessor agrees that its exclusive remedy shall be to
terminate this lease in the event a court ... determines that the
default has not been cured ....21
The leases contained a drilling commitment that lessee drill one well in
the first year and five additional wells per year until 203 wells had been
drilled. In the event that lessee failed to meet its drilling commitment, the
leases would terminate, but lessee would retain wells that had been drilled
and twenty acres (subsequently reduced to five acres by amendment)
around each well.22 The leases also provided for a minimum royalty
payment of $5.00 per year if the production royalties did not exceed
$5.00.23
One oil well was drilled on each lease and there was oil production until
1996. From 1996 to 2013 the lessee failed to make any payments under the
leases to the lessors.24 There was no production from the lands during that
time. In addition, the lessee did not maintain continuous drilling operations
under the leases.25 In 2013 lessors, SLT Holdings, LLC, Jack E.
McLaughlin and Zureya McLaughlin (“Lessors”) filed a complaint in
equity against current lessee, Mitch-Well Energy, Inc. (“Mitch-Well”),
seeking among other things, a court determination that the leases were
abandoned. The trial court granted summary judgment on the abandonment
claim and the Superior Court affirmed. 26 On appeal, Mitch-Well argued
that the Superior Court failed to give effect to the provisions of the leases,
specifically the term clause and the default clause. 27
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
2019).
27.

Id.
Id. at 891.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 217 A.3d 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct.
SLT Holdings, LLC, 249 A.3d at 892.
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The Supreme Court determined that the lower courts failed to consider
whether the Lessors had an adequate remedy at law before invoking the
equitable doctrine of abandonment.28 The Court also distinguished the
present facts from two precedential decisions that discussed the doctrine of
abandonment: Aye v. Philadelphia Co. and Jacobs v. CNG Transmission
Corp.29 Aye found an oil and gas lease abandoned after a four-year period
after two initial wells drilled were dry. The subject lease did not address
the issue of dry wells.30 In Jacobs the district court concluded that the
production rights under an oil and gas lease had been abandoned when the
lessee made storage rental payments under the lease but did not produce
any oil or gas for almost fifty years. 31 The Court concluded that the finding
of abandonment in Jacobs was dicta because the district court also held that
the lease was breached. 32 The Court found that in this case, the lower courts
should have made the requisite finding that the lessors lacked an adequate
remedy at law before proceeding to grant equitable relief. 33
The Court concluded that lessors may have an adequate remedy at law
under the terms of the contract. Principally, the lease contained the abovequoted requirement that the lessor give lessee notice of a default and an
opportunity to cure. 34 Plaintiffs must first show that their legal remedy is
inadequate before seeking equitable relief. Here, on summary judgment, the
Lessors did not do so. 35 The Court reversed and remanded back to the trial
court.
C. Pennsylvania Superior Court
1. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 245 A.3d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct.
December 8, 2020)
●

On remand from the Supreme Court, in a nonprecedential
decision the Superior Court affirmed summary judgment in favor

28. Id. at 894-95 (citing Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 529 Pa. 241,
602 A.2d 1277, 1286 (1992); St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. Goddard, 14 Pa. Cmwlth. 624, 324
A.2d 800, 802 (1974); Sexton v. Stine, 456 Pa. 301, 319 A.2d 666 (1974); Merrick v.
Jennings, 446 Pa. 489, 288 A.2d 523 (1972)).
29. Id. at 895.
30. Id. (citing Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 193 Pa. 451, 44 A. 555, 556 (1899)).
31. Id. (citing Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 759, 792 (W.D. Pa.
2004)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 897.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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of oil and gas lessee on trespass claim because landowner failed
to allege facts demonstrating physical trespass to subsurface
estate.
On remand from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 36 the Superior
Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant oil and gas operator and against the plaintiff landowners, where
the landowners alleged a subsurface trespass to their oil and gas estate.37
The plaintiff-landowners, the Briggs, sued operator Southwestern Energy
Production Company (“Southwestern”) for trespassing on their lands by
drilling and hydraulically fracturing unconventional wells on an adjacent
property. 38 Southwestern moved for summary judgment on the Briggs’
claims citing the rule of capture. The rule of capture is a “fundamental
principle of oil-and-gas law holding that there is no liability for drainage of
oil and gas from under the lands of another sold long as there has been no
trespass.”39 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Southwestern applying the rule of capture. 40
The Briggs appealed the trial court order in 2018. On direct appeal, the
Superior Court reversed the trial court. The Superior Court distinguished
unconventional oil and gas operations from conventional operations, citing
the costs of drilling unconventional wells and the use of technology to
influence drainage. 41 The operator subsequently appealed to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.
The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order and remanded for
further proceedings, finding that the Superior Court erred by holding the
rule of capture did not apply to unconventional development. The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the Superior Court to consider whether the
Briggs sufficiently alleged that fractures, proppant or fluids entered their
lands from the parcel being developed. Without a physical trespass, the rule
of capture precluded liability.42
On remand, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s initial ruling in
favor of the operator. The Briggs did not allege that Southwestern drilled
onto their property or that it propelled proppants and fluids onto their
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2020).
Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 245 A.3d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020).
Id. at *1.
Id. at f. 2 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).
Id. at *1.
Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
Briggs, 245 A.3d 1050 at *3.
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property. 43 Without allegations of a physical intrusion, the Briggs’ claim for
trespass failed.44
D. Federal District Court
1. Walls v. Repsol Oil & Gas USA, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-00782, 2020 WL
5502151 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2020)
●

District Court granted a motion to dismiss in favor of an oil and
gas operator affirming the operator’s right to construct a pipeline
under an oil and gas lease and transport gas from off the
leasehold premises.

William M. Walls, James Oakes and Francis X. Oakes (“Landowners”)
entered into an oil and gas lease in 2002 (“Lease”) that contained the
following clause granting the initial lease operator, Victory Energy
Corporation, and its subsequent assignee, Repsol Oil and Gas USA LLC
(“Lessee”), the rights of:
[d]rilling, producing, and otherwise operating for oil and gas and
their constituents, including the right to conduct geophysical,
seismic and other exploratory tests, and of laying pipe lines, and
building tanks, roads, stations, and electric power lines, houses
for valves, meters, regulators and other appliances, with all
rights and privileges necessary, incident to or convenient for the
operation of this land alone and [conjointly] with neighboring
lands45
The Lessee pooled the Lease acreage into a gas production unit. In 2019,
the Lessee began constructing a pipeline system on the leasehold to
transport gas from the production unit, but also from lands that were not a
part of the unit. The Landowners and the Lessee attempted to negotiate a
separate pipeline agreement but failed. The Lessee constructed the pipeline
under the rights granted in the Lease. 46
The Landowners filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga
County seeking a declaratory judgment that the Lease did not authorize the
construction of the pipeline or Lessee’s use of the pipeline to transport gas
from units that did not contain any of the Lease acreage. Lessee removed
43. Id. at *4.
44. Id.
45. Walls v. Repsol Oil & Gas USA, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-00782, 2020 WL 5502151, at 6
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2020).
46. Id. at1.
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the action to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss because
Landowners failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 47
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
agreed with Lessee and dismissed the complaint. The District Court found
the plain language of the Lease unambiguous and finding no ambiguity, the
District Court looked to the written Lease to determine the intent of the
parties. The District Court concluded that “Plaintiffs agreed to a contract
granting the lessee . . . authority to perform a set number of tasks, including
‘laying pipe lines.’”48
Furthermore, the District Court explained that beyond the aforesaid
enumerated rights, the Landowners granted Lessee “all other rights and
privileges necessary, incident to or convenient for” the operation of the
Lease acreage and neighboring lands. 49 Stated another way, the District
Court said that “only the rights and privileges not specifically enumerated
in the Lease must be ‘necessary, incident to or convenient for’ the operation
of the land.”50 The District Court found that the granting clauses permitted
the lessee the right to lay pipelines on the Lease lands, without restriction or
limitation. As a result, the District Court granted Lessee’s motion to
dismiss.
2. Bradford Energy Capital, LLC v. SWEPI LP, No. 17-1231, slip op.,
2020 WL 5747841 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2020).
●

District Court granted summary judgment in favor of oil and gas
operators where a non-operator’s claims for breach of an
operating agreement were barred by the statute of limitations and
precluded by the exculpatory clause of the operating agreement.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
granted summary judgment in favor of oil and gas operators when a nonoperator’s claims for breach of joint operating agreement were barred by
the statute of limitations and precluded by the exculpatory clause of the
operating agreement. 51 Plaintiff Bradford Drilling Associates XXVII L.P.
(“Bradford Drilling”) entered into a Cost Plus Drilling and Operating

47. Id.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Bradford Energy Capital, LLC v. SWEPI LP, No. 17-1231, slip op., 2020 WL
5747841 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2020).
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Agreement (“Operating Agreement”) with East Resources, Inc. in 2009. 52
Plaintiff Bradford Energy Capital, LLC (“Bradford Energy”) was the
general managing partner of Bradford Drilling. East Resources was the
designated “Operator” under the Operating Agreement and had exclusive
decision-making authority with regard to the operation of oil and gas
wells.53 Bradford Drilling was a designated “Non-operator” under the
Operating Agreement. 54 Bradford Drilling did not have decision-making
authority.
The Operating Agreement contained an exculpatory clause limiting the
Operator’s liability to conduct resulting from the Operator’s gross
negligence or willful misconduct.55 East Resources drilled a number of
wells under the Operating Agreement in 2009, including the “Fitch Well” in
Tioga County. The Fitch Well was completed in 2010 but appeared to have
some irregularities during East Resources’ completion that would affect
productivity of the well. 56
In 2010, East Resources merged with and into Royal Dutch Shell PLC
(“SWEPI”). SWEPI became the Operator under the Operating Agreement
and of the Fitch Well. SWEPI never developed the Fitch Well or put it into
production.57 Instead, SWEPI sought to place the Fitch Well on inactive
status in 2012—meaning the well is capable of production but not
producing.58 Beginning in 2012, representatives from Bradford Energy
expressed concern to SWEPI that the Fitch Well had not been placed into
production.59 SWEPI responded but did not indicate the Fitch Well would
be placed into production any time soon.
In 2017, SWEPI sold its assets in Tioga County, including the Fitch
Well, to Rockdale Marcellus LLC (“Rockdale”). Rockdale became the
Operator under the Operating Agreement. 60 Bradford Energy and Bradford
Drilling (together, “Bradford”) filed suit on June 29, 2017, in the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County against SWEPI for breach of the
Operating Agreement. SWEPI removed to federal court and Rockdale

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
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intervened. 61 Bradford alleged that SWEPI breached the Operating
Agreement by failing to connect the Fitch Well to a gathering system and
that Rockdale assumed liability for SWEPI’s breach under the asset
Purchase and Sale Agreement entered by SWEPI and Rockdale. 62
Rockdale filed its motion for summary judgment on two grounds: first,
that Bradford’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and second,
that the exculpatory clause in the Operating Agreement precluded a finding
of liability.63 The District Court agreed on both accounts and granted
judgment in Rockdale’s favor as a matter of law. 64
The District Court concluded that Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract actions applied to Bradford’s claims. 65
Because Bradford commenced its action on June 29, 2017, its claims would
be time barred if the cause of action accrued before June 30, 2013. Bradford
admitted in its court submissions and through its witnesses that the alleged
breach occurred in 2011. Under that admission, the District Court held that
the statute of limitations precluded the claim.
The District Court noted in its analysis of the breach of contract claim
that Bradford alleged SWEPI violated the Operating Agreement by failing
to connect the Fitch Well to a nearby pipeline. Bradford’s witnesses
testified that a gathering system was completed in 2011. Bradford’s expert
witness gave an opinion that the breach occurred no later than January
2012.66
The District Court also looked at Bradford’s prayer for relief, which
sought damages dating back to January 1, 2012—i.e., the date the breach
occurred. As such, the statute of limitations began to run no later than
January 1, 2012, unless Bradford could show that an exception applied.
Bradford’s awareness that the Fitch Well was not producing and its
communications with SWEPI demonstrated that Bradford knew of the
alleged breach and simply failed to file a lawsuit. The District Court held
that no exception applied, and the action was barred by the statute of
limitations.67
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id.
63. SWEPI also filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that any liability it may
have had transferred to Rockdale pursuant to the asset sale. The court found SWEPI’s
motion mooted by its decision on Rockdale’s motion for summary judgment.
64. Id. at 14, 18.
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 14.
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The District Court next concluded that Rockdale could not be liable to
Bradford for not putting the Fitch Well into production because that action
fell within the Operating Agreement’s exculpatory clause.68 To prove
liability and avoid the exculpatory clause, Bradford needed to show that
SWEPI’s decision not to put the Fitch Well into production constituted
gross negligence or willful misconduct. Bradford could not rely upon a
simple breach of the Operating Agreement or allegations of negligence. 69
Gross negligence is behavior that is “flagrant, grossly deviating from the
ordinary standard of care.”70 Willful misconduct is conduct where “the
actor desired to bring about the result that followed, or at least that he was
aware that it was substantially to ensure.”71 Considering the facts available
to SWEPI at the time of the alleged conduct, the District Court concluded
that SWEPI did not act with gross negligence or willful misconduct.
SWEPI looked at the data showing the Fitch Well experienced issues
during completion and made a determination that it was not economical to
produce the well. Bradford alleged that SWEPI was grossly negligent and
exhibited willful misconduct because it should have known the Fitch Well
would be highly productive. 72 The District Court concluded that Bradford's
evidence did not establish a genuine question of fact as to whether the pre2012 data available to SWEPI demonstrated that putting the Fitch Well into
production would result in substantial profits to both SWEPI and
Bradford. 73 Because there was no gross negligence or willful misconduct,
the District Court held that SWEPI's decision not to put the Fitch Well into
production fell within the Operating Agreement's exculpatory clause and
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 74
3. Coastal Forest Resources Company v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:20cv-1119, 2021 WL 1894596, (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2021).
●

District Court granted a motion to dismiss a breach of contract
suit claiming an oil and gas lessee improperly deducted postproduction costs from royalty payments.

68. Id. at 18.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 15 (quoting Albright v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 696 A.2d 1159, 1164 (Pa.
1997) (quoting Bloom v. DuBois Regional Medical Center, 597 A.2d 671, 679 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991)).
71. Id. (quoting Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 212 A.2d 440, 443 (Pa. 1965); Renk
v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994)).
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 18.
74. Id.
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Plaintiff oil and gas lessor Coastal Forest Resources Company
(“Coastal”) filed claims for breach of contract and accounting against oil
and gas lessee Chevron USA Inc. (“Chevron”) for alleged improper
deductions from lease royalties.75 Chevron filed a motion to dismiss for
failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 76
The lease contained the following gas royalty provision in relevant part:
Gas: To pay Lessor as royalty for all gas and the constituents
thereof, including all liquid, solid or gaseous substances
produced and saved from any sand or sands on the leases
premises, an amount equal to five-thirty-seconds (5/32) or
15.625% of the gross sales price received by Lessee from the
sale of such gas and the constituents thereof at the wellhead.77
The District Court first reviewed Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., 78
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether oil and gas
leases that calculated royalties by using the netback method violated the
Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act (“GMRA”). 79 “Under the net-back
method, royalties are paid subject to the right of the operator to recoup its
post-production expenses.”80 Royalties are calculated as one-eighth of the
sale price of the gas minus one-eighth of the post-production costs of
bringing that gas to market. After considering a variety of industry specific
treatises that broadly defined the term “royalty” the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concluded that the GMRA should be interpreted to permit “the
calculation of royalties at the wellhead, as provided by the net-back
method.”81
The District Court rejected Coastal’s contention that Kilmer was a case
of narrow statutory interpretation limited to the construction of the GMRA
and was not meant to provide an expansive definition that would allow the
net-back method to be used when “at the wellhead” language is present. 82
The case cited by Coastal, Marburger v. XTO Energy, Inc., was
distinguishable because the royalty provision there did not use the term “at
75. Coastal Forest Resources Company v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:20-cv-1119,
2021 WL 1894596, 1 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2021).
76. Id. at 1.
77. Id. at 2 (emphasis provided).
78. 605 Pa. 413, 990 A.2d 1147 (Pa. 2010).
79. Coastal Forest Resources Company, 2021 WL 1894596 at 3; see 58 P.S. § 33.1
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 4 (quoting Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1158).
82. Id.
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the wellhead.”83 The District Court noted that the royalty owners could not
point to any cases where “at the wellhead” was not found to permit
deduction of post-production costs.84
The District Court concluded that “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
determination was broad and should be afforded broad application
whenever the term ‘at the wellhead’ is used.”85 Citing the express language
of the lease which stated royalties are calculated “at the wellhead,” the
District Court concluded that the lease “expressly and unequivocally”
allowed the lessee to deduct costs incurred while getting the gas to the
market. Because there was no breach of the lease, the District Court granted
Chevron’s motion and dismissed Coastal’s claims for breach of contract
and accounting.86
4. Wayne Land & Mineral Grp., LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n.,
No. 3:16-CV-897, 2021 WL 54209 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2021).
●

The District Court denied motion for summary judgment by the
Delaware River Basin Commission on claims that natural gas
drilling operations constituted “projects” under the Delaware
River Basin Compact requiring permits from the Commission.

Plaintiff Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC (“WLMG”) filed a
complaint against the Defendant Delaware River Basin Commission (the
“DRBC”) seeking declaration that the DRBC did not have jurisdiction over
oil and gas projects.87 The DRBC filed a motion for partial summary
judgment asking the court to declare that WLMG’s (“Plaintiff”) planned
activities of drilling for natural gas and related uses of land constituted a
project within the meaning of the Delaware River Basin Compact. 88 The
court denied said motion and did not grant summary judgment to the
DRBC.
On May 17, 2016, WLMG filed a complaint against the DRBC. In the
Complaint, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter a declaratory judgment holding
that DRBC ‘does not have jurisdiction over, or the authority to review and
approve, or to require WLMG to seek prior approval from the [DRBC] for,
83. Id. at 5 (citing Marburger v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 15-910, 2016 WL 11659184
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2016)).
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id. at 7.
87. Wayne Land & Mineral Grp., LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, No. 3:16-CV897, 2021 WL 54209 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2021).
88. Id. at 1.
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or to otherwise preclude the development of, WLMG’s proposed well pad,
appurtenant facilities or the related activities to be carried out on the
Property.”89 On March 23, 2017, the District Court granted the DRBC’s
motion to dismiss. This was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit who vacated the District Court’s order and remanded
for further proceedings.90
At issue was the power of the DRBC to declare the intended operations
of WLMG as a project subject to the DRBC’s approval. The DRBC was
created under the Delaware River Basin Compact (the “Compact”), which
was entered into by Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania,
on November 2, 1961. The DRBC “is tasked with the adoption and
promotion of uniform and coordinated policies for water conservation,
control, use and management in the Delaware River Basin.” 91 Section 3.8 of
the Compact defines a “project” as, “any work, service or activity which is
separately planned, financed, or identified by the commission, or any
separate facility undertaken or to be undertaken within a specified area, for
the conservation, utilization, control, development or management of water
resources which can be established and utilized independently or as an
addition to an existing facility, and can be considered as a separate entity
for purposes of evaluation[.]”92 The District Court held that Plaintiff’s
planned activities were a project as defined under the Compact. The Circuit
Court using a contract law analysis disagreed, holding that, “the proposed
activities constituted a ‘project,’ concluding that ‘the meaning of the word
‘project’ as used in the compact is ambiguous’ and, therefore, the district
court’s decision on the merits was premature.” 93
The WLMG owned land in Wayne County, Pennsylvania, a portion of
which lies within the Delaware River Basin and that they intended to drill
for natural gas using hydraulic fracturing and follow a wastewater
management plan. The District Court proceeded to analyze the term
“project” first as it pertained to the express terms of the Compact. The
DRBC acknowledged that although some of the proposed activities of
WLMG, including hydraulic fracturing, were for the purpose of extracting
natural gas, other activities were “for the purpose of managing wastewater

89. Id.
90. Wayne Land & Min. Grp., LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 959 F.3d 569 (3d
Cir. 2020).
91. Wayne Land & Mineral Grp., LLC, 2021 WL 54209 at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 3.
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and protecting and conserving water resources.”94 The DRBC argued that
“the literal language of the definition of ‘project’ compels the conclusion
that WLMG’s wastewater activities and structures constitute a ‘project.’”95
The WLMG responded that the activities identified by DRBC did not
satisfy the Compact definition of project because they were not a separate
entity for purpose of evaluation as required by the definition of “project”
under § 1.2(g) of the Compact.96 The District Court determined that there
was ambiguity in the definition of “project” under the Compact.
The District Court looked at the legislative history of the Compact, the
Compact’s course of performance, and other interstate compacts. The
WLMG asserted that “‘Projects,’ as that term was used and understood by
those involved in [sic] history and negotiation of the Compact, meant water
resource development undertakings like reservoirs. Second, ... by no means
did those involved use or understand the term ‘project’ to encompass
individual pieces of equipment like the pieces of equipment identified in the
Commission’s motion.”97 The DRBC asserted that “project” should
encompass anything that they have the “authority over control and
development of water resources within the Basin including ‘water supply,
pollution control, flood protection, watershed management, recreation,
hydroelectric power, and the regulation of withdrawals and diversions of
water.’”98 The District Court concluded that the legislative history did not
sufficiently support the DRBC’s summary judgment motion.
As to the course of performance, the DRBC cited a 1964 amendment to
its comprehensive plan:
The underground water resources of the Basin shall be utilized,
conserved, developed, managed and controlled in view of the
needs of present and future generations, and of the resources
available to them. To that end, the use, interference, impairment,
penetration or artificial recharge of an aquifer or of any other
underground water resource shall be subject to review and
evaluation under the Compact.99

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
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The DRBC argued that because the WLMG’s proposed activities would
penetrate an aquifer and return wastewater to the surface, its actions should
be subject to DRBC review.100 The WLMG refuted this stating that:
until its recent assertion of jurisdiction over gas wells, and now
their component parts, the Commission routinely exercised
jurisdiction over prototypical water resource development and
management projects. Doc. 175 at 42. The Commission
reviewed water supply wells, industrial and public water
supplies, wastewater treatment plants, navigation projects and
surface water outtakes. Id. The Commission, however, did not
review any of the thousands of residential, commercial or
industrial developments in the Basin or their component parts.101
Due to the disagreement about the course of performance, the District
Court declined to assess the arguments during pretrial motions. 102
Lastly, the court looked at other interstate compacts, notably the
Susquehanna River Basin Compact (“SRBC”), which was enacted in 1970
by Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and the United States. The parties
agreed that the definition of “project” under the SRBC was similar to that
under the Compact. The DRBC stated that “the Susquehanna River Basin
(“SRBC”) by regulation has identified unconventional natural gas
development and hydrocarbon development as ‘projects’ as defined in the
Susquehanna River Basin Compact, a definition similar to the definition of
‘project’ in the Delaware River Basin Compact.”103 The WLMG disagreed,
focusing again that their proposed activities were for hydrocarbon
development and not “for the conservation, utilization, control,
development or management of water resources.”104 The WLMG argued
that because the SRBC permitted natural gas development activities
“pursuant to a permit-by-rule process” persons seeking to develop their
natural gas rights had not had sufficient reason to challenge the SRBC’s
jurisdiction.”105 Ultimately the District Court denied the motion for
summary judgment because of the ambiguity related to the term “project”
found by both it and the Circuit Court.106
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
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